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ABSTRACT 
There is a body of literature that favors universal and unconditional public assurance 
policies over those that are targeted and means-tested. Two such proposals—the basic 
income proposal and job guarantees—are discussed here. The paper evaluates the impact 
of each program on macroeconomic stability, arguing that direct job creation has inherent 
stabilization features that are lacking in the basic income proposal. A discussion of 
modern finance and labor market dynamics renders the latter proposal inherently 
inflationary, and potentially stagflationary. After studying the macroeconomic viability of 
each program, the paper elaborates on their environmental merits. It is argued that the 
“green” consequences of the basic income proposal are likely to emerge, not from its 
modus operandi, but from the tax schemes that have been advanced for its financing. By 
contrast, the job guarantee proposal can serve as an institutional vehicle for achieving 
various environmental goals by explicitly targeting environmental rehabilitation, 
conservation, and sustainability. Finally, in the hope of consensus building, the paper 
advances a joint policy proposal that is economically viable, environmentally friendly, 
and socially just. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Basic income and job guarantees are two proposals in the public interest resting on the 
conviction that universal and unconditional policies are more effective and fairer than 
programs which are targeted and means-tested. The points of agreement stem from a 
rejection of modern welfare and labor market policies as inequitable and inefficient, and 
from an open-ended commitment to guaranteeing the right to livelihood for all 
individuals. Both policies aim to enhance individual freedom, economic opportunity, 
advanced citizenship, and social inclusion via poverty eradication, human capital 
enhancement, community revitalization, and environmental renewal. How to reach these 
goals, however, is vigorously contested and there are many sources of the disagreement. 
Briefly, basic income supporters see modern economies as moving towards 
increasingly precarious labor markets and argue that jobs cannot be the answer to a better 
life (Aronowitz and DiFazio 1994). In addition, while some individuals are exempt from 
work (due to inheritance, for example), others are compelled to work, often in “bad” jobs, 
for their livelihood. Therefore, it is argued that any social policy which enhances real 
freedom must give individuals equal access to nature’s endowments via guaranteed 
income but without the coercion to work for it (Van Parijs 1995). Such a policy will 
further emancipate them from coercive employment by empowering them to say “no” to 
demeaning or simply compulsory labor (Widerquist 2004). Capitalism is viewed as 
inherently unjust in large part because of the dependency on work for income. Thus, the 
core objective of the basic income policy is to sever the link between the two.  
By contrast, job guarantee supporters argue that basic income advocates have 
misconstrued the problem of income insecurity (Harvey 2003; Mitchell and Watts 2004). 
A well-structured guaranteed employment program that offers opportunities for 
meaningful work at a living wage unavoidably counters the precariousness of the labor 
market by eliminating unemployment, drastically reducing poverty, and enhancing the 
individual freedom to say “no” to bad jobs. In other words, in a monetary market 
economy, many of the observed labor market problems stem from insufficient quantity 
and quality of jobs. Only after the right to work has been secured for all can we   3
adequately evaluate the failures of market and welfare policies (Harvey 2003). Securing 
the right to work is the overriding objective for job guarantee advocates.  
Some important criticisms are leveled at the economic viability of basic income 
proposals. The main charge is that they are inherently inflationary with potentially 
disastrous consequences for the currency. Additionally, the strong destabilizing effect of 
basic incomes on labor markets and wages makes the policy potentially stagflationary 
and hyperinflationary (Mitchell and Watts 2004; Tcherneva 2006a). 
The goal of this chapter is threefold. First, it explores the macroeconomic viability 
of each program in the context of modern monetary production economies. Second, it 
elaborates on their environmental merits. Finally, in hope of consensus building, it 
advances a joint policy proposal that is economically viable, environmentally friendly, 
and socially just.  
 
2  CAN WE PAY FOR BASIC INCOME OR JOB GUARANTEES?  
 
Throughout this chapter, two specific policy proposals will be discussed. The basic 
income guarantee (BIG) of interest is that which supplies a universal payment to each 
citizen, irrespective of race, gender, marital status, or labor market participation, at a level 
sufficient to purchase the basic necessary standard of living.
1 The job guarantee program 
is of the type that offers a federally funded job to anyone ready, willing, and able to work, 
but who has not found desired private sector employment. It provides a living wage and 
decent working conditions. The program is modeled after recent proposals for public 
service employment (PSE), the government as the employer of last resort (ELR), and the 
buffer stock employment (BSE) models.
2 
                                                 
1 There are many incarnations of the basic income guarantee. Partial basic income and the negative income 
tax (NIT), for example, will not be discussed here because they are, respectively, either deficient to buy the 
minimum standard of living or contingent on labor-market participation. Full basic income, by contrast, is 
that which is set at subsistence level (Van Parijs 1992) or at the official poverty line (Clark 2004), although 
for Van Parijs, maximization of individual opportunities and freedom requires that it is set at the highest 
sustainable level (Van Parijs 1992, 1995, 2004). 
2 There is broad general consensus over the purpose and design of these programs (e.g., Harvey 1989; Wray 
1998; Mitchell 1998). While history is replete with direct job creation programs, they tend to be of limited 
duration and subject to punitive means tests—two features that job guarantee supporters strongly oppose.    4
  False notions of public finance are perhaps the single most important obstacle to 
implementing important government policies. Much has been written on how to pay for 
basic income and job guarantees.
3 Such discussion is technically relevant only for those 
countries which have given up sovereign control over their currencies (e.g., which are 
under a currency board or some other fixed exchange rate regime). Sovereign currency 
nations, however, (the majority of the countries in the world) do not face operational 
financing constraints. To be sure, they face political constraints that could be shaken with 
full appreciation of the workings of sovereign currencies. Although the ideology of the 
“tax-payer’s money” is entrenched in all contemporary discourse, it is crucial to dispel its 
false premises to adequately understand the nature of the universal guarantees. This is the 
purpose of this section. 
There is a large body of literature that has focused on the principles of sovereign 
finance.
4 There are three specific tenets I want to emphasize here. First, taxation and 
spending are always two independent operations, but under flexible exchange rate 
regimes the former do not and cannot finance the latter. A sovereign currency nation can 
always pay for its public programs of choice, be they basic income, job guarantees, or 
any other, irrespective of tax collections. This does not mean, however, that tax 
collections are unimportant. The second point to emphasize is that while money emission 
does not depend on taxes, tax collections are crucially important for maintaining the 
viability of the currency. In fact, in monetary production economies, the value of the 
currency is linked to what one must do to obtain it (for repayment of taxes or other 
obligations), and the public sector can directly set its terms of exchange and, therefore, 
affect its value. Third, in a modern market economy, unemployment is always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon that can be effectively addressed with a proper 
application of sovereign finance. 
 
 
                                                 
3 See, for example, debates between Clark (2003) and Harvey (2003). 
4 This work is largely part of the modern money approach, also known as chartalism, neochartalism, tax-
driven money, or money as a creature of the state. The approach is most closely associated with the 
writings of George. F. Knapp ([1924] 1973) and Abba. P. Lerner (1947), but finds support in much of the 
economic literature, ranging from Adam Smith to J. M. Keynes (for a detailed survey of chartalism, see 
Tcherneva 2006b).   5
2.1   Sovereign Currency Control 
A most common mistake is to conflate government with nongovernment finance. While 
the private sector is indeed restricted by revenue or borrowing for its spending, this is not 
the case for the public sector, which “finances” its expenditures in its own money. This is 
a reflection of the single supplier (or currency monopoly) status of the latter. As the tax-
driven approach to money has made clear, the purpose of taxation is not to “finance” state 
spending, but rather to create a demand for the currency of the Sovereign. In modern 
economies, such as in the United States, United Kingdom, or Japan, the currency (the 
dollar, pound, and yen, respectively) is not a “limited” resource of the government 
(Mosler 1997–98). The consolidated government (with the Treasury and the central bank 
as its agents) spends by crediting private bank accounts and taxes by debiting them. Thus, 
taxation today functions not to finance government spending but to create demand for 
otherwise unbacked state currencies. This way the money-issuing authority can purchase 
requisite goods and services from the private sector. Taxation is, in a sense, a vehicle for 
moving resources from the private to the public domain.  
If the purpose of taxation is to create demand for state money, then logically and 
operationally, tax collections cannot occur before the government has provided that 
which it demands for payment of taxes. In other words, not only are spending and 
taxation two entirely independent operations, but also the former must necessarily 
precede the latter. Another way of seeing this causality is to say that government 
spending “finances” private sector “tax payments” and not vice versa.
5   
In sum, sovereign governments have a public monopoly over the domestic 
currency. Government spending precedes taxation, and spending always creates new 
HPM, while taxation always destroys it. Therefore taxes are never stockpiled and cannot 
be respent to “finance” future expenditures. This also means that the budget balance is 
an ex post accounting result. A “budget neutral” policy aims to gauge some subsequent 
accounting result, which gives no knowledge of the economic consequences of that 
policy.  
                                                 
5 It has also been demonstrated that bonds do not “finance” government spending either. Bond sales 
maintain the target interest rate by draining excess reserves of high-powered money (HPM), which have 
been created through government spending (Wray 1998; Mosler 1997–98; Bell 2000).   6
While governments may not be operationally constrained in their spending, it is 
crucially important what programs they chose to finance. As sole suppliers of fiat 
currency, they also have the responsibility for maintaining its value, and certain policies 
are better suited to do that than others.  
 
2.2  The Value of the Currency 
Taxes create demand for government money, but they also impart value to it. Innes 
(1913) stressed that: “A dollar of money is a dollar, not because of the material of which 
it is made, but because of the dollar of tax which is imposed to redeem it.” He also argued 
that “the more government money there is in circulation, the poorer we are.”  In other 
words, if government money in circulation far exceeds the total tax liability, the value of 
the currency will fall. Thus, it is not only the requirement to pay taxes, but also the 
difficulty of obtaining that which settles the tax obligation, that gives money its value.  
This important relationship between leakages and injections of high-powered 
money (HPM) is difficult to gauge. Since the currency is a public monopoly, the 
government has a direct method at its disposal for determining its value. For Knapp, 
payments with state fiat measure a certain number of units of value (1973 [1924]: pp. 7-
8). For example, if the state required that to obtain one unit of HPM, a person must 
supply one hour of labor, then money will be worth exactly that—one hour of labor 
(Wray 2003). Thus, as a monopoly issuer of the currency, the state can determine the 
value of the latter by setting “unilaterally the terms of exchange that it will offer to those 
seeking its currency” (Forstater and Mosler 1999).
6 
What this means is that the state has the power to exogenously set the price at 
which it will provide HPM, i.e., the price at which it buys assets, goods, and services 
from the private sector. While it is hardly desirable for the state to set the prices of all 
goods and services it purchases, it nonetheless has this prerogative. As it will be 
discussed later, through the job guarantee, the money monopolist need only set one price 
to anchor the value of its currency. By contrast, the basic income guarantee does not set 
any terms of exchange for the sovereign currency; instead it provides it unconditionally.  
                                                 
6 Wray (2003) notes: “If the state simply handed HPM on request, its value would be close to zero as 
anyone could meet her tax liability simply by requesting HPM.”    7
2.3  Unemployment is a Monetary Phenomenon 
The last point to make in this section is that unemployment is a monetary phenomenon. 
This has been well demonstrated by Keynes in the General Theory, but the tax-driven 
approach to money sheds new light on what Keynes meant by “money is a bottomless 
sink of purchasing power…[and] there is no value for it at which demand [for it] is 
diverted … into a demand for other things” (Keynes 1964 [1936]). 
Government deficit spending necessarily results in increased private sector 
holdings of net financial assets. If the nongovernment sector chronically desires to save 
more than it invests, the result will be a widening demand gap (Wray 1998). This demand 
gap cannot be filled by other private sector agents because in order for some people to 
increase their holdings of net savings, others must decrease theirs. In the aggregate, an 
increase in the desire to net save can only be accommodated by an increase in 
government deficit spending. Mosler explains: 
 
Unemployment occurs when, in aggregate, the private sector wants to work and earn the 
monetary unit of account, but does not want to spend all it would earn (if fully employed) 
on the current products of industry… Involuntary unemployment is evidence that the 
desired holding of net financial assets of the private sector exceeds the actual [net 
savings] allowed by government fiscal policy. (Mosler 1997–98) 
 
Similarly, Wray (1998) concludes that “unemployment is de facto evidence that the 
government’s deficit is too low to provide the level of net saving desired.” In a sense, 
unemployment keeps the value of the currency because it is a reflection of a position 
where the “government has kept the supply of fiat money too scarce.” While traditional 
economists argue that we must force slack on the economy in order to maintain the 
purchasing power of the currency, as this paper will explain, well-designed full-
employment government policies can do the job. 
To sum up, a sovereign government is not operationally constrained in funding 
public programs. But the money monopolist also has the responsibility of maintaining the 
value of the currency. Because at present it does not set the terms of exchange for its 
currency, it uses unemployment to maintain its purchasing power. Unemployment is a 
monetary phenomenon and a reflection of keeping the currency too scarce. With this in   8
mind, we can evaluate the economic impacts of implementing basic income and job 
guarantees. 
 
3  MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE BASIC INCOME 
GUARANTEE 
 
A focal point of the basic income proposal is its budget-neutral stance (Atkinson 1995; 
Van Parijs 2004). Such analysis presumably stems from efforts to quash neoliberal 
objections to government deficit spending (Mitchell and Watts 2004). This section argues 
that preoccupation with budget neutrality is wrong headed for two reasons. First, it 
obfuscates the inflationary nature of BIG by relying on conventional notions of public 
finance. Second, because taxes are largely endogenous, attempts to “raise” sufficient tax 
revenue to counterbalance the increased spending on BIG is likely to be self-defeating 
with perverse macroeconomic effects.   
 
3.1  Inflation—An Inherent Feature of BIG 
As the tax-driven approach to money makes clear, taxes impart value to the currency by 
creating demand for it. Additionally, currency’s value is determined by what is required 
to obtain it. In the case of a BIG, there is no such requirement, as income payments are 
disbursed universally and unconditionally. If a program is instituted whereby the 
population can freely obtain the unit that fulfills the tax obligation, the value of the 
currency will deteriorate sharply. While this may not happen at once, over time the value 
of an unconditionally provided currency will ultimately tend to zero. It must be stressed 
that the basic income is not inflationary because it is financed by “fiat” money, but 
because the currency is essentially “free” (Tcherneva and Wray 2005a) and is supplied on 
demand to all. Therefore it effectively invalidates the purpose of taxes—to create demand 
for the government’s currency. We can then easily envision a scenario where the 
currency loses its value and private sector agents reprice their transactions in terms of 
some other (stronger) currency. History is replete with such examples. From the inability 
to collect income and corporate taxes in Russia in the late 1990s, to the provision of 
“free” currency through uncollateralized lending in Eastern Europe during the transition   9
period, to the accelerating interest rate payments on public debt in Turkey in the 1990s, 
all policies have resulted in a collapsing domestic currency and flight to stronger foreign 
currencies (for details, see Hudson 2003; Mitchell 2002; Tcherneva 2006a).  
It is not only the fact that the currency is free that produces a destabilizing effect. 
A basic income guarantee that buys the minimum standard of living (suppose that amount 
is equal to $20,000 in the United States) will cause an exodus from the labor force of 
workers who used to “earn” their minimum standard of living by working. In other 
words, workers in some (possibly most) $20,000-paying jobs will opt out of the labor 
force (especially if they are “bad” jobs). So the next issue to investigate is the impact of 
basic income guarantees on labor force participation and economic activity. 
 
3.2  The Impact of BIG on Government Budgets, Wages, Prices, and the Labor 
Force  
Since tax collections are largely endogenous, the preoccupation with budget neutrality of 
BIG policies can produce tax schedules that may have perverse market effects. In fact, it 
may prove impossible for the BIG proposal to be budget neutral.  
Some have proposed, for example, that the basic income guarantee is “financed” 
by a flat tax (Clark 2004; Atkinson 1995). It is reasonable to expect that the guarantee of 
$20,000 of basic income will induce some people in “bad” $20,000-paying jobs to exit 
the market (a desirable effect according to BIG advocates). The resulting impact on 
employment, income, and tax collections will be negative. As tax revenues fall, a budget 
deficit results and, although the deficit itself does not pose a problem, the compulsion 
will be to raise tax rates to achieve intended budget-neutrality. This tax increase would 
induce a new cohort of workers now earning $20,000 after-tax income to leave the labor 
market in hope to live on the BIG benefit. All additional tax increases attempting to catch 
up with rising BIG payments will further erode employment and output (again, with a 
logical limit of zero).  
If taxes are progressive (as advocated by Aronowitz and Cutler [1998] and 
Aronowitz and DiFazio [1994], for example), this substitution effect may take somewhat 
longer to materialize, but if they are regressive (as proposed by Van Parijs [1995] and 
Meade [1989]), the labor force drop-out rate will be considerably higher, since regressive   10
taxes carry larger disincentives to work in low-wage jobs. In any event, BIG will be 
unlikely to achieve budget neutrality because tax collections are endogenous and never 
able to catch up with the rising BIG benefit payments.  
The impact on the labor force and output is also negative. This seemingly 
“voluntary” exit from the labor force is BIG’s solution to unemployment. This is a 
contrived result, however, as full employment is achieved by conceiving an artificial 
reduction in the labor supply (Mitchell and Watts 2004). In effect, full employment takes 
the form of “forced inactivity.” In order to coax BIG recipients back into the labor 
market, some employers will need to offer higher wages (which, at first approximation, is 
a desirable effect). However, soon thereafter, the same employers will also raise prices to 
cover their wage cost increases. As a consequence, rising prices will erode the purchasing 
power of the BIG payment, undermining the economic conditions of its recipients. To 
maintain the objective of the universal guarantee and provide a minimum necessary 
standard of living, there will be pressure to revise the BIG benefit upward. Such a move 
will induce some additional exit from the labor market, a drop in output, a compensatory 
rise in wages and prices, and a further drop in BIG’s purchasing power. This vicious 
cycle renders the income guarantee self-defeating. Note that if the benefit is continually 
increased, the income guarantee becomes not just inflationary, but hyperinflationary.  
Simultaneously, an increase in taxes to achieve budget neutrality will induce 
workers on the margin to exit the labor force. The negative effect on the labor force 
participation due to rising BIG payments and tax rates, along with the subsequent prices 
increases, would lead to increasingly lower output, lower employment, and higher prices 
than before BIG was implemented. If policy makers continually increase the benefit to 
compensate recipients for the loss of purchasing power and simultaneously continually 
increase taxes to “fund” the rise in expenditures, the likely result will be stagflation—low 
employment and high prices.
7 
Since BIG never quite manages to give people the necessary purchasing power, 
some individuals will be forced back into the labor market, quite possibly into “bad” jobs. 
                                                 
7 Mitchell and Watts (2004) also argue that stagflation is a likely result because of the expected income 
redistribution and deteriorating inducement to invest caused by the BIG policy.   11
So the implementation of BIG is likely to produce an environment of involuntary 
unemployment and higher prices.  
In sum, we have to be mindful of how the government supplies the currency to the 
population. Erroneous logic of public finance leads to concerns with budget neutrality 




4  MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE EMPLOYER OF LAST 
RESORT 
 
Keynes (1964[1936]) argued that “unemployment develops…because people want the 
moon—men cannot be employed when the object of desire (i.e., money) is something 
which cannot be produced and the demand for which cannot be readily choked off.” As 
the tax-driven approach to money further makes clear, unemployment results from the 
chronic desire of some private sector agents to hoard net financial assets, a desire which 
can only be accommodated by the public sector. Hyman Minsky (1986) recognized that 
unemployment was a monetary phenomenon and indicated how desired financial 
resources can be supplied by simultaneously implementing a successful full-employment 
strategy. For him, it was the role of government to divorce the determination of full 
employment from the profitability of hiring. This could only be accomplished when the 
government created an infinitely elastic demand for labor. 
Lerner (1943) also argued that it was the government’s job to keep spending 
“neither greater nor less than that rate which at the current prices would buy all the goods 
that it is possible to produce.” Spending below this level results in unemployment, while 
spending above it causes inflation. The goal is to keep spending always at the “right” 
level in order to ensure full employment and price stability. 
Two policies, virtually identical in design, that embrace Minsky’s full-
employment strategy and Lerner’s functional finance approach are the Employer of Last 
Resort (Mosler 1997–98; Wray 1998) and the Buffer Stock Employment Model (Mitchell 
                                                 
8 See also Abba Lerner (1947) whose proposal for “functional finance” upheld that policy should be guided 
not by antiquated notions of “sound finance,” but by the effect of finance on economic activity.    12
1998).
9  These policy prescriptions aim to eliminate unemployment and simultaneously 
stabilize the value of the currency. The proposals are motivated by the recognition that 
sovereign states have no operational financial constraints, can discretionarily set one 
important price in the economy, and can provide an infinitely elastic demand for labor. 
Through ELR, the government sets only the price of public sector labor, allowing 
all other prices to be determined in the market (Mosler 1997–98). The fixed public sector 
wage provides a sufficiently stable benchmark for the value of the currency (Wray 1998). 
Since governments are not fiscally constrained, the program is implemented on a fixed 
price/floating quantity rule, i.e., hiring in the ELR is not limited by budget caps (more 
below), and spending fluctuates countercyclically. Therefore, the key macroeconomic 
merits of ELR that are missing from BIG proposals are its ability to stabilize the business 
cycle, the value of the currency, and the overall price level. 
 
4.1  ELR Stabilizes the Business Cycle  
With the job guarantee, government spending on public employment fluctuates 
countercyclically. In downturns, private business establishments lay off workers who find 
employment in the public sector. Government spending automatically increases, 
providing the necessary economic stimulus. Conversely, as the economy improves and 
private sector employment expands, workers are hired away from the ELR pool, reducing 
government deficit spending. This serves as a powerful automatic stabilizer that ensures 
that government spending is always at the “right” level to maintain full employment. By 
contrast, the basic income guarantee has a destabilizing effect on the business cycle, due 
to its inflationary bias and negative impact on participation rates and output. 
 
4.2  ELR Fixes the Value of Currency 
Since the value of the currency is determined by what must be done to obtain it, with an 
ELR in place, it is linked to the public sector wage. Suppose the government pays a 
public worker $20,000 year (for approximately 2000 hours of work), the value of the 
currency will be anchored by the effort expended to earn this income, i.e., its benchmark 
                                                 
9 Employer of Last Resort (ELR) is Minsky’s terminology, which is used throughout this paper as a generic 
term for direct job guarantees.   13
value is equal to $10 an hour. In other words, $1 is worth 6 minutes of work. Now 
suppose that instead of paying $20,000, the government decides to pay $40,000 to ELR 
workers. The hourly wage jumps from $10 to $20 per hour. It now takes workers half the 
time (3 minutes) to earn what they used to before the increase in the public sector wage. 
All else equal, the purchasing power of the currency falls by half (i.e., $10 now buys half 
an hour of work). By contrast, if the government cuts the yearly salary to $10,000, 
workers will need to work twice as much to obtain the same amount of dollars as before, 
which raises the currency’s value.  
Purchasing power is measured in terms of the labor units the currency can buy. As 
with BIG, the implementation of an ELR will cause a one-time jump in prices. However, 
since the purchasing power of the currency is tied to the labor hours it can buy, and thus 
its value does not deteriorate progressively as it does with BIG, there is no imperative to 
continually redefine the wage upward. The public sector wage provides an internally 
stable benchmark for prices.  
 
4.3  ELR Enhances Price Stability 
Policies of “priming the pump,” such as military Keynesianism, are inflationary, as they 
primarily hire “off the top” by competing for the most desirable workers (Wray 1998). 
ELR, by contrast, hires “off the bottom” and does not introduce these inflationary 
pressures. In fact, it enhances price stability for two main reasons. First, ELR is a buffer 
stock program that operates on a fixed price/floating quantity rule, and second, deficit 
spending on public service employment is always at the right level. 
 
ELR is a Buffer Stock Program Operating on a Fixed Price/Floating Quantity Rule 
Economists usually fear that high levels of employment can introduce wage-price spirals. 
Therefore, it is necessary to show how the ELR contributes to wage stability, which, in 
turn, promotes price stability. As Mitchell (1998) and Wray (1998) have stressed, the key 
is that the ELR is designed as a buffer stock program that operates on a fixed 
price/floating quantity rule. The idea is to utilize labor as a buffer stock, and, as is the 
case with any buffer stock commodity, the program will stabilize that commodity’s price.    14
In a nutshell, during recessions, jobless workers find employment in the public 
sector at the fixed ELR wage. Total government spending rises to relieve deflationary 
pressures. Alternatively, when the economy recovers and nongovernment demand for 
labor increases, ELR workers are hired into private sector jobs at a premium over the 
ELR wage. Government spending automatically contracts, relieving these inflationary 
pressures. In other words, when there is an upward pressure on the buffer stock’s price, 
the commodity is sold, and when there are deflationary forces, it is bought. Public sector 
employment thus acts as a buffer stock that shrinks and expands countercyclically.  
The program operates on a fixed price/floating quantity rule, because the price of 
the buffer stock (the public sector wage) is fixed and the quantity of the commodity 
(public sector employment) is allowed to float. The exogenous public sector wage is 
internally stable and, since labor is a basic commodity (employed directly and indirectly 
in the production of every other kind of commodity), it serves as a perfect benchmark for 
all other commodity prices. It is in this sense that the public sector wage provides a stable 
anchor for prices in the economy. This important inbuilt feature of the ELR program has 
no comparable counterpart in income guarantee proposals.  
 
Deficit Spending on ELR is Always at the Right Level 
This buffer stock mechanism ensures that government spending is (as Lerner had 
instructed) always at the “right” level. The tax-driven approach to money explains that 
there is nothing inherently wrong with running deficits.
10  For ELR advocates, the “right” 
level of deficit spending is that which ensures full employment. However, the 
countercyclical design of the job guarantee program also ensures that deficit spending 
will counteract inflationary or deflationary pressures.  
Inflations or deflations occur when aggregate demand is too large or too small 
relative to aggregate production and the productive capacity of the economy. The key to 
offsetting these pressures is to boost income and spending just to that level sufficient to 
purchase the entire full-employment level of output, not more and not less. By design, the 
ELR program guarantees that any resulting budget deficit is never too big or too small. 
                                                 
10 In fact, if the nongovernment sector runs a surplus, i.e., hoards net financial assets, the government sector 
(by accounting identity) will run a deficit.   15
Government spending will increase until unemployment is eliminated, at which point 
deficits will stop growing, ensuring that aggregate demand does not exceed the full-
employment level of aggregate supply. Conversely, if unemployment grows again, so 
will deficit spending, bringing the two into equilibrium. In other words, the automatic 
countercyclical and stabilizing feature of the ELR program guarantees that spending will 
grow only up to the full-employment level of output.
11  By contrast, basic income 
programs cannot claim any such countervailing force to price demand changes. 
ELR projects also support a noninflationary environment by enhancing human 
capital and private sector efficiency and growth. Unlike BIG, ELR directly provides for 
the maintenance and appreciation of human capital, as training and education are explicit 
features of the program. Furthermore, by addressing the problem of unemployment head-
on, ELR also reduces the social and economic costs associated with it. Finally, private 
sector productivity is enhanced by directing ELR projects to develop public 
infrastructure, provide for costly environmental cleanup, and reduce rigidities linked to 
high levels of capacity utilization.  
It has been increasingly recognized that public policies must enhance not only 
macroeconomic stabilization, but also environmental sustainability. The next section 
specifically focuses on the environmental merits of basic income and job guarantees. 
 
5 ENVIRONMENTAL  ASPECTS  OF BASIC INCOME AND JOB 
GUARANTEES  
  
There is significant common ground that informs the environmental concerns of BIG and 
ELR advocates. Much of it rests on a rejection of contemporary growth-at-all-cost 
macroeconomic policies, which cause unequal income distribution, wasteful 
overconsumption at the top, and poverty and destitution at the bottom.  
 
                                                 
11 There has been some confusion about the operation of the ELR (Sawyer 2003). It is important to note 
that ELR eliminates unemployment by offering a job to everyone willing and able to work, not by 
increasing aggregate demand. While a rise in aggregate demand may result as a consequence of the 
program, this does not have to be the case. The government can eliminate unemployment via the ELR 
while simultaneously reducing its spending on other programs and raising taxes. This is hardly a desirable 
recommendation, but it illustrates that ELR can eliminate unemployment in the face of falling aggregate 
demand. It does so by offering a job, not by “pump priming” (for details, see Mitchell and Wray 2005).    16
5.1  Growth, Income Distribution, and the Environment 
ELR advocates view policies that aggressively aim to stimulate private investment as 
destabilizing, inflationary, and environmentally damaging. Hence, the private sector is 
unable to guarantee the attainment and preservation of either full employment or 
environmental sustainability. For this reason, the public sector has an important role to 
play in addressing both objectives. The specific proposal advanced is that of “green” 
public sector jobs (Forstater 2004). For basic income supporters, on the other hand, eco-
friendly outcomes spring naturally from: 1) the expected redistribution toward more 
equal incomes; 2) subsequent reduction in growth rates;
12 and 3) suggested program 
financing through pollution or resource taxes. I will discuss growth and income 
distribution first and will return to eco-friendly taxes later.  
Continuous growth rests on sustained and rising rates of economic expansion, 
increasing resource extraction and their maximum utilization. The underlying competitive 
forces of cost minimization often imply large-scale industrial pollution (as environmental 
cleanup is expensive and unprofitable), while uneven income distribution that comes with 
modern pro-growth policies induces some environmentally damaging activities among 
the poor (e.g., Haitian and Amazon deforestation). Those forces are at odds with 
environmental sustainability and could ultimately lead to the Tragedy of the Commons 
(Lord 2003). 
BIG is expected to produce environmentally desirable outcomes by equalizing 
income distribution at the bottom. This will mean, for example, that indigenous people in 
Brazil will no longer need to log the Amazon for subsistence. It would also means that 
wasteful consumption at the top may continue unimpeded unless there is considerable 
income redistribution and a decline in overall growth. 
Growth is checked by the fact that BIG provides an opportunity to withdraw from 
the labor market and engage in nonmarket activities—an outcome which some believe 
should be celebrated (e.g., Murray 1997). If this is a likely scenario, all the negative 
consequences from a reduction in the labor force discussed above will apply with full 
force, making BIG economically infeasible. 
                                                 
12 Although there is no consensus around this outcome.   17
An important question to consider is how BIG would trigger 
ecoconscientiousness. Will the logging of the Amazon stop or will it be seen as a source 
of extra income that would improve one’s standard of living above and beyond what is 
afforded by the minimum guaranteed income? Will U.S. consumers buy more organic 
food and fewer sport utility vehicles, or will the poor also queue up for the next (now 
affordable) gas-guzzler? What will make companies opt for environmentally clean 
technology, especially in the face rising labor costs due to a mass exodus of workers from 
the labor force? None of these results are guaranteed by the provision of basic income. To 
be fair, BIG supporters have argued that the program should be supplemented by other 
socially desirable policies (e.g., environmental regulations), but in this case any 
environmental benefits will stem from the latter and not from the provision of basic 
income. To this end, it is hard to believe that in modern capitalist economies the sole 
provision of income will set in motion an extraordinary chain of events that will entice 
individuals to voluntarily opt for “simpler and more environmentally-friendly lifestyles” 
(as it is argued, for example, in Cohen and Rogers [2001]). The stark reality is that those 
with the simpler lifestyles are those who have no income; the access to guaranteed 
income will now allow them to partake more actively in mainstream society and culture 
which will likely lead to more complex consumption patterns in the race to keep up with 
the Joneses or simply improve one’s own standard of living. In such circumstances, the 
environmental outcomes from guaranteeing income are ambiguous.  
   ELR proponents agree that creating jobs at any price (e.g., at the expense of the 
environment) is not a viable policy option. Minsky had long argued that getting to full 
employment by stimulating aggregate demand could lead to inequitable and destabilizing 
outcomes, as priming the pump tends to be environmentally unsustainable, inflationary, 
and an overall unreliable means of achieving and maintaining full employment.  
It seems that BIG advocates reject job guarantees in large part because they 
falsely equate them with contemporary pro-growth, pro-investment, pro-profit practices. 
It is perhaps not well understood that ELR decouples the determination of full 
employment from any specific level of economic growth. At the margin, full employment 
is secured by the public sector directly hiring all who wish to work and does not depend 
on growth, aggregate demand, investment subsidies, or tax incentives. Growth is a   18
consequence of, and not a precondition for, full employment. Furthermore, when ELR 
jobs are designed with the environment in mind, we are effectively redefining growth to 
include environmentally friendly output and employment.  
  Note that BIG proposals are still dependent on growth for the source of their 
financing (e.g., income taxes). Thus, the desires of BIG to check growth and its 
dependence on growth for financing are fundamentally at odds with each other. Such a 
conundrum cannot be satisfactorily resolved. As argued above, nations with sovereign 
and freely floating currencies do not face operational financing constraints, and thus, the 
financing of BIG need not depend on a particular level of growth. BIG supporters, 
however, are unlikely to embrace the tenets of modern finance because these propositions 
immediately render their policy inflationary. 
Furthermore, if BIG indeed proves to be inflationary (or hyperinflationary) then it 
will produce more unequal income distribution when the poor opt out of “bad” jobs in 
hopes to live on the basic income while the value of that payment is gradually being 
eroded. In this case it is likely that the poor will be far from emancipated from 
compulsory work and may be forced back into the labor market. In addition (even if they 
so desire), they may be unable to engage in more environmentally friendly activities such 
as buying locally grown food or ecological appliances—as all will still be prohibitively 
expensive. Therefore, any environmentally friendly consequences the access to income 
might have will evaporate along with the deflated real value of that income. 
  By contrast, ELR does not depend on specific levels of growth for its 
implementation, but it is a pro-growth policy to the extent that it stabilizes the business 
cycle, enhances human capital, and improves the investment environment. In addition, its 
commitment to eco-friendly public service jobs contributes to environmentally 
sustainable growth. What an eco-friendly ELR program looks like is explored in the next 
section.  
 
5.2  Public Service Employment and the Environment 
ELR advocates are interested not only in offering unconditional employment, but also in 
structuring the program in a way to addresses very specific economic concerns—
environmental degradation, urban blight, gender inequality, deficient elderly and child   19
care, inadequate training and education, and others. The strong environmental concerns 
stem specifically from the acknowledgement that there is an immediate need for 
environmental cleanup and restoration that the private sector has no incentive to perform 
at the requisite level. ELR jobs should be part of a comprehensive program for 
environmental sustainability and can be the first and immediate step toward 
environmental rehabilitation and conservation. Many of these tasks can be undertaken by 
relatively unskilled labor. Forstater (2004) has called for a “Green Jobs Corps” as an 
important model for ELR work, where an environmental tax is incorporated explicitly in 
the proposal and a detailed application of eco-friendly tasks is advanced. Some of the 
ELR jobs will include reforestation, water, soil, and air cleanup, aggressive recycling 
efforts at the local and national level, insulation and weatherproofing for residential and 
some commercial buildings, and the conversion to alternative energy of all public 
industries and institutions.  
Separately, with the pressing climate change, cities, municipalities, and nations 
alike are beginning and will continue to face increasing costs to their economies. For 
example, a moderate sea level increase will inundate coastal regions, causing flooding, 
collapsing infrastructure, and possible forced migration of hundreds of millions of people 
worldwide (Goodstein and Doppelt 2006). Such large-scale problems will require a 
timely and comprehensive response. The recent experience with Hurricane Katrina, for 
example, has demonstrated that it is the public sector that must be prepared to spring into 
action. An organized and ready public jobs corps could respond before, during, and after 
a crisis. ELR workers can fortify levies and evacuate residents in advance, and they can 
reconstruct ports, piers, and other much needed infrastructure in both the devastated areas 
and the healthy communities overwhelmed by a migrating population. Vanden Heuvel 
(2005) has called for a new “New Deal” to rebuild New Orleans. This is the kind of work 
ELR workers can perform.  
Infrastructure in many developed nations is crumbling. For example, in 2007, one 
out of every eight highway bridges in the United States were structurally deficient and 
close to one out of every seven were functionally obsolete (Department of Transportation 
2007). In much of the underdeveloped world, nonexistent infrastructure is a major 
obstacle to economic development. An ELR program can undertake repair and   20
construction of infrastructure at the needed level. In sum, a well-structured ELR can 
demonstrate that full employment does not conflict with environmental sustainability; it 
can, in fact, enhance it. 
 
5.3  Environmental Aspects of BIG  
The environmentally friendly outcomes of BIG policy are likely to emerge not from the 
provision of guaranteed minimum income, but from the various proposals advanced for 
its financing that rely on resource use and pollution taxes. There are numerous policies 
for equitable land use and egalitarian resource allocation, under the names of Sky Trust, 
Alaska Permanent Fund, and the Earth Dividend, to name a few. Each of these either 
represents equal access by all citizens to earth’s resources (Earth Dividend) or to the 
profits generated from using these resources (Sky Trust and Alaska Permanent Fund). 
These programs, however, are not the same as the Basic Income Guarantee discussed 
here. Some scholars have proposed that BIG should be financed through pollution or 
other ecological taxes (e.g., Van Parijs 1995). What I argue here is that the agenda for tax 
reform that BIG supporters suggest can be an essential feature of any policy for social 
reform. However, resource or pollution taxes should not be conceptualized as financing 
instruments for BIG. Indeed, if BIG supporters insist that pollution or any other resource 
or environmental taxes “pay” for the BIG program, the policy will be self-defeating, as 
resource-based taxes cannot be relied upon to provide the income that will buy the 
minimum necessary standard of living.  
A resource-based tax aims to discourage the use of a particular resource. With 
regard to taxes on pollution or resource use, the most effective tax policy is one which 
manages to generate the least amount of revenue, i.e., that which has deterred pollution or 
the depletion of the resource. To link BIG to such a tax would mean either that: 1) when 
the tax is successful in protecting the environment, sufficient revenue is not generated to 
cover all recipients or that 2) the tax is ineffective, and more pollution and environmental 
abuse may be taking place in order to generate sufficient revenue for BIG coverage. In 
the latter case, especially if BIG is very popular, there may even be a perverse incentive 
to subsidize, say, oil production, so that its increased output can later be taxed in order to 
keep the BIG fund “solvent.”    21
In sum, an environmental tax policy is an important policy objective, but it would 
be a mistake to structure BIG or ELR as dependent on ecological taxes for their 
financing. If, for example, “bad” resource use is taxed (such as pollution or oil drilling) 
and the funds are invested in “good” resource use (say solar or wind energy production), 
over the long run there will be greater incentive to move away from dirty to clean energy. 
However, these funds will not be able to secure the minimum required standard of living, 
as the Alaska Permanent Fund has demonstrated, for example, where the individual 
payments have never exceeded $2000 per person annually. Such a “fund” may be an 
effective environmental policy, but not an effective basic income policy.
13 Again, the 
proposition of this paper is that if the basic income cannot buy the minimum standard of 
living for all, the policy is neither effective nor just.  
To summarize, for BIG supporters the provision of income is the overriding 
objective and the “green” consequences are expected to naturally ensue from there. 
However, it seems more plausible that the environmental benefits of BIG stem from the 
tax mechanisms discussed and not from the provision of income to all. By contrast, for 
ELR advocates, guaranteeing full employment is essential through targeted job creation 
into areas that repair, support, and enhance the environment. Eco-friendly activities are 
explicitly incorporated in the institutional setup of ELR jobs. Since there are no 
operational constraints for funding either policy, tax reform for environmental purposes is 
an entirely different matter—a worthy goal in its own right.  
 
6  THE ROAD TO PARTICIPATION AND THE PROMISE FOR A JOINT 
PROPOSAL 
 
Since the objective is to provide for all members of society, and not just for the 
economically active population, a joint proposal is necessary. To be economically viable 
and environmentally friendly, however, it needs to have several key ingredients. First, it 
must tie the provision of income to public service work in the form of fixed hourly pay. 
Second, it needs to provide unconditional income support for the young, the elderly, and 
                                                 
13 Even this outcome is debatable. The Alaska Permanent Fund, for example, invests its oil earnings into a 
portfolio of assets, many of which come from industries that are not eco-friendly. The dividend payment to 
Alaskans is therefore linked to how profitable these industries are.   22
the disabled. Third, it must be carefully structured according to the biophysical conditions 
of the environment and support environmental preservation, rehabilitation, and renewal.
14 
  Such a proposal is desirable, because inactivity, especially due to involuntary 
unemployment, has far-reaching consequences beyond the single dimension of a loss of 
income (Sen 1999). Therefore, BIG’s focus on the provision of income alone will not 
provide the necessary remedy. By contrast, ELR’s concern with currency stability should 
not take precedence over the objective of creating “good” jobs. Given the many common 
goals income and job guarantees share, a joint proposal that is environmentally 
sustainable is a promising alternative for providing the requisite standard of living to all.  
There are many sources we can consult when designing such a proposal. For 
example, Atkinson’s (1995) participation income and White’s (2003) civic minimum 
offer some possibilities for marrying ELR with BIG.
15  These proposals emphasize the 
need to define work very broadly, foster social inclusion, enhance human capital, and 
improve the overall “socioeconomic situation” (Clark 2003; Fitzpatrick 2003). Minsky’s 
(1986) discussion of the “the road to participation” also provides some of the ingredients 
for such a joint policy. For him, the road to participation means creating permanent 
programs whose main purpose is to provide “public services, environmental 
improvements … as well as the creation and improvement of human resources.” 
This paper explained the economic imperatives that make it necessary to tie the 
hourly income benefit to an hour of public work. Nonetheless, this coercive feature will 
still trouble BIG advocates, so the challenge is to design a proposal that enhances 
individual freedom by allowing people to determine their own pursuits. One way to do 
this is to allow the individuals to choose, and even define, the kind of activities they wish 
to perform. Although involvement in the community is compulsory, the kind of work 
performed is not.  
To see how this can be accomplished, we can look to the job guarantee program 
that was recently implemented in Argentina.
16  While this program is only available to 
unemployed heads of households, it offers insights for designing a joint policy. The 
                                                 
14 For explanation of these biophysical conditions, see Forstater (2004). 
15 Fitzpatrick (2003), Galston (2001), and Anderson (2001), among others, support some conditionality 
purporting that there must be a reciprocal obligation on the part of the basic income recipient. 
16 The institutional details and macroeconomic effects of this program have been discussed in detail in 
Tcherneva and Wray (2005b).   23
Argentinean program (usually referred to as Jefes) intended to deal with the massive 
poverty, unemployment, and social dislocation that resulted from the 2001–2002 crisis. 
After the decision was made to fund the job guarantee, the federal government 
only provided the general guidelines for administering the program. The actual 
management and administration was done at the local level. The municipalities evaluated 
the general needs of their communities and their available resources. Subsequently, they 
made requests for proposals for specific projects that would provide the goods and 
services that were most needed in the communities.  
The Jefes plan was in fact started as a form of basic income. After registering all 
the unemployed heads of households, they immediately started receiving income. In the 
transition period, many did not work, as it took some time to design, approve, and 
implement the proposed projects. However, the program was up and running in four 
months, and soon thereafter beneficiaries started taking up the newly created public 
sector jobs. 
In fact, most of the actual activities were designed and proposed by NGOs, local 
government organizations, labor movements, and the unemployed themselves. But they 
had the forum and institutional support that allowed them to engage in the kind of 
activities they wished to do. Because nutrition was a top priority in the poorest 
communities, many such projects included community kitchens, bakeries, or pastry 
shops. Other projects converted previously barren plots into arable land, where the 
beneficiaries set up their own agro-cooperatives. Yet others centered solely on landfill 
cleanup and recycling. In some of the poorest areas, resident had organized en masse to 
recycle cardboard and plastic from Buenos Aires’s large garbage dumps. Some projects 
used recycled plastic to make toys and Christmas tree ornaments, others collected and 
repaired old and ragged books and clothes from wealthier neighborhoods to distribute to 
newly built community centers in the poorest neighborhoods.  
Official surveys of program participants indicate that having an income is not 
among the main reasons for satisfaction with the Jefes plan. Beneficiaries enjoy being in 
the program because they have the opportunity “do something,” to work in a “good 
environment,” to “help the community,” and to “learn” (Figure 1). 





















In other words, it is possible to design a program that will guarantee an income to 
all, but will require able-bodied persons to participate in community work. Such a 
program can be structured to give people considerable freedom (subject to some general 
guidelines) to determine the kind of community work they would like to perform. Such 
activities can include not only helping in the community, but also engaging in individual 
artistic pursuits. Such programs can also be motivated by concerns for the environment. 
By marrying the participation income with the job guarantee, we design a policy 
that offers the institutional vehicle for achieving other desirable social goals. Whether the 
objective is environmental cleanup, reforestation or recycling, whether it aims to assist 
young parents with family planning or to address issues of domestic violence, spousal 
and child abuse, and male high school dropout rates, public sector jobs can be oriented to 
deal with such problems. In fact, Argentina provides many examples of public sector 
projects that deal with all of the above. Once the institutional framework for community 
work is established, it can be directed to address other social problems as well. 
Finally, a joint policy will enjoy prolonged success if motivated by an awareness 
that valuable work is not only that which is profitable, but also that which is socially 
useful and environmentally sustainable. In other words, the activities in this program will 
be targeted toward adequate social provisioning and not toward profit making. The 
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“production for use” in the public sector will not compete with the “production for profit” 
of the private market. Government jobs will provide services that are presently outside 
the purview of profit making enterprises, e.g., environmental cleanup, childcare, elderly 




The dichotomy between policies that target “only income” or “only employment” is no 
longer constructive. An effective safety net must provide both a guaranteed source of 
income and a guaranteed source of work opportunities in meaningful, life-enhancing 
activities. In a monetary production economy, however, it is important to tie the provision 
of income to participation in the community for everyone who is able to contribute. This 
way the socioeconomic situation is improved by creating an economically viable policy 
that stabilizes the price level and the business cycle, while enhancing the meaning of 
work and individual freedom.  
Whether universal guarantees stand a chance depends largely on the political will 
and dominant ideology, but the first step is to gain a full appreciation of their 
macroeconomic consequences and institutional aspects. Then we can constructively move 
to designing economically viable and environmentally friendly universal assurances in 
the public interest. 
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